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Abstract
The observable activity of translation, the series of text comprehension and text production bursts we identify as 
translation, is the result of the activation of complex underlying cognitive systems. In the conduct of research it is 
often useful to approach such complex systems using a ‘levels of explanation’ framework. This paper considers David 
Marr’s (1982) three levels of explanation as they might apply to understanding translation and translation expertise 
more robustly. In cognitive translation studies to date, we have not really extended our understanding of expertise much 
past the second (algorithmic/representational) level in Marr’s scheme; we have failed to grapple as effectively as we 
might with the problem of how the second generation computationalist expertise constructs we adopted almost twenty 
years ago could be integrated with, for instance, connectionist neural network models of the mind, creating a third 
generation of expertise models. This paper offers some frameworks laying out how that end might be achieved using, 
for instance, symbolic connectionism and implementational connectivism. Further, it argues that given the overtly 
symbolic nature of translation language processing, cognitively-oriented translation scholars are uniquely suited to 
benefit from approaches that bridge the divide between symbol processing models and connectionist ones.
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1. Levels of organization and explanation
The cognitive activity we refer to as translation could be viewed as arising from a hierarchical-
ly organized “complex system” of interacting components in the sense defined by McClamrock 
(1991: 185): “The standard model of the multiple levels of a complex system is a rough hierarchy, 
with the components of each ascending level being some kind of composite made up of the enti-
ties present at the next level down.”
One of the features of such systems is that active relationships between the lower-level constit-
uents of such a system can give rise to an aggregate or collective behavior observable at the next 
ascending level that is not attributable to any discrete constituent. The collective behavior emerg-
es as a property of the system as a whole. Thus, we can say complex systems have systemic prop-
erties that we can observe and document empirically, even when it is sometimes unclear how they 
have arisen. Often we need significant epistemological assistance in comprehending and explain-
ing how such system behavior emerges.
As observers of complex systems, it is possible to formulate explanations of system behavior 
at higher (coarser-grained) and lower (finer-grained) levels, and with a potentially indeterminate 
number of levels in between. The behavior of a complex system, a particular organism, or even 
the functioning of the mind, might then be explained at various levels of explanation depending 
on what entities and events are chosen as the focus of observation, what the research interest is, 
or the level of abstraction chosen for analysis.
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Regarding the mind as a complex system, the levels are not a disguised claim for the psycho-
logical reality of systemic hierarchy; they are instead best seen as a useful analytic device for un-
derstanding, for explaining. Using discrete levels of explanation is, thus, not a claim that the mind 
is physiologically partitioned into neat hierarchical levels. If it is, we have no absolute proof of 
such a hierarchy, and modern cognitive science is currently struggling with just such fundamen-
tal questions of the structure and function of the brain and how it gives rise to thought and con-
sciousness.
The indeterminacy and apparent seamless unity of the actual state of the mind, however, does 
not deter us from making assumptions about it for the purposes of explanation and empirical veri-
fication. David Marr argues that levels of explanation are levels “at which an information process-
ing device must be understood before one can be said to have understood it completely” (Marr 
1982: 24). Verdejo/Quesada (2011: 5) describe the distinction between levels as “a fundamental 
point that clarifies successful explanations in cognitive psychology.” Thus, the use of levels is an 
explanatory device employed to achieve an understanding of systems that are otherwise too com-
plex to grasp, and where the boundaries and interactions of components are so ill defined that we 
might otherwise have trouble encompassing them. 
This paper argues that regardless of the apparent unitary seamlessness of the system under ob-
servation, levels of explanation may still be of significant relevance for research, especially in 
cognitive translation studies, where our research object, we consider, is uniquely suited to such an 
explanatory approach because of its systemic complexity. The importance of adopting a compre-
hensive ‘levels of explanation’ perspective in cognitive translation studies has also been discussed 
in Shreve/Diamond (2016). 
What we call translation, following the argument above, is a high-level functional, goal-orient-
ed activity that might be seen as arising from the interaction of sub-systems of constituent entities 
at lower levels. There might be questions we would want to ask about translation that would best 
be answered at a particular level of explanation, and exploring lower levels of the system might 
not be productive. If we want to explore the relationship of reading activities to writing activities 
in a translation task, we might focus on a higher level of the system for our explanation than if we 
had a question about how focus of attention and saliency of perceptual cues interact with working 
memory, where our focus might be at a lower level of the system. If we had to explain why, after 
trauma to the brain, a translator might lose one of her two languages, then explanation at the lev-
el of brain architecture and neuronal arrays might be more appropriate. As Wilkinson (2014: 373) 
remarks: “If one has explanatory concerns that operate at a certain level, addressing them at a dif-
ferent level is at best, sub-optimal, and at worst, completely irrelevant or opaque.”
If the focus of attention is the translating mind, then we might imagine that at a very low level 
of organization are the neurological processes of the brain as they implement phenomena such as 
language processes and memory retrieval. At a higher level of organization might be a composite 
goal-oriented activity, as for instance the act of translating the text itself. Between these two lev-
els, where cognitive translation studies and cognitive science usually intersect, are perhaps mul-
tiple levels of intermediate mental processes of cognition that come online as needed during the 
progression of the translation task. We might enumerate the intermediate levels of explanation 
as including more general cognitive processes belonging to the categories Harnish (2002: 5) dis-
tinguishes: “attention, memory, learning, reasoning, problem solving, and aspects of motivation 
theory, action theory, perception, and language processing.” Harnish’s list includes many, if not 
all, of the types of mental processes whose interdependent operation during a task might underlie 
and explain the higher-level activity of translation. Even this level of explanation is still relatively 
high, where memory processes like storage and retrieval could be considered composites of even 
lower level memory processes.
From this perspective we could begin to explain translation by looking at its constituent sys-
tems and answer questions about how the entire complex activity enacted during the translation 
task could be carried out. We would have to specify what specific processes comprise it (algo-
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rithms, functions), how they interact, and what representations they might act upon (words, trans-
lation units, texts). Of course, cognitive scientists will recognize in this approach Marr’s (1982) 
and Pylyshyn’s (1984) framework of levels of explanation to be used when studying complex 
cognitive systems. Marr took an explicitly information processing (computationalist) perspective, 
claiming that complex systems could be explained at three levels of organization, the computa-
tional, the algorithmic/representational and the implementation level. Pylyshyn (1984) identified 
the semantic, the syntactic, and the physical levels. 
Regardless of the computationalist context of the original formulations, there is a strong case 
to be made that as connectionist and situated cognition explanations of cognition become more 
widespread in our and other disciplines, levels of explanation still have an important place, as 
long as we understand that they are more about the utility of understanding “proper inter-level 
explanatory relations” and not necessarily about whether a “structure at a high level of descrip-
tion is reproduced in MR [author’s note: mental representation] at a lower level of description” 
(Verdejo/Quesada 2011: 11).
2. Levels of translation analysis
From a leveled approach, at the highest level in cognitive translation studies we have to look at 
the main task activities of translation, the sub-tasks being carried out and the goals of those tasks. 
Here, for instance, we might focus (simplistically, I finesse the details) on source text (ST) com-
prehension, transfer, and target text (TT) production as the three main high-level task sequences. 
The highest level is goal-oriented, it proceeds from a task-oriented functional viewpoint: what 
is being done and why? The highest level of analysis is really an abstract functional conceptual-
ization of the activity being studied. At the middle level (or at any number of intermediate lev-
els), we focus on the functional decomposition of the task abstraction at the higher level, speci-
fying, for instance, the underlying fundamental cognitive processes and their associated mental 
representations. What do we mean here by fundamental? We mean that such processes are general 
cognitive processes that are not, strictly speaking, translational until they are brought online and 
activated during a translation task.
Note that these processes are studied on-line because what we want to understand is how these 
constituents (themselves abstractions created for utility of explanation) behave and interact when 
they are engaged as elements of a larger system activated during goal-oriented processing. It is 
important to understand that the output of the complex systems we observe when we watch a 
translator translate, e.g., with keystroke logging or eye tracking, is produced only during task per-
formance, hence the imperative for us, as translation researchers, to constantly keep in mind the 
pervasive influence of the functional goal-orientation of the highest level of explanation. The so-
called intermediate constituents of the system are always under the influence, impacted by, the 
task-related systemic constraints of higher levels. Their nature and operation is always task de-
pendent.
Middle level analysis focuses not on a more general ‘what’ or ‘why,’ but on a more specific 
‘how,’ and there can be a wide range of hows proposed for explaining system functions. For in-
stance, how could translation be explained by looking at cognitive processes as computational 
algorithms, and with specific kinds of discrete mental representations as data structures? (from a 
computationalist point of view, but more on this later.)
Finally, at the lowest level, we would focus on how these activated translation task-bound pro-
cesses and entailed representations are realized in the neural system of a human being. Neurons 
and neuronal arrays are the implementation or physical level, a specification of how proposed in-
termediate level representations and processes could be implemented in the human brain.
Let us consider the comprehension stage of the translation process. Comprehension is a gen-
eralizing construct that could possibly subsume several sub-processes, including lexical decod-
ing during perception and activation of lexical entries in a lexical store (lexical access). If multi-
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ple languages are represented in the store, then appropriate lexical items must be selected (lexical 
selection), a process mediated via a shared conceptual store, which is also activated. Then there 
is syntactic parsing; morphological markers and lexical sequences are analyzed to establish logi-
cally meaningful relationships between the concepts activated during serial lexical access and se-
lection. Those concepts, stored in long-term memory, activate other concepts and build a mental 
representation as we proceed through the text, very much as described in Walter Kintsch’s con-
struction-integration model (1988).
From the levels of organization perspective, we can see that we have functionally decomposed 
the higher-level process of comprehension into its process constituents (lexical access, syntac-
tic parsing, propositional elaboration, long term memory retrieval, and so on, none of which are 
identifiably translational until they are activated during a task). These processes, which we often 
think of in the abstract, as if they were not always activated in a broader task context, are altered 
by the circumstances of their activation. Thus the nature of, for instance, lexical access may differ 
when activated during a bilingual task as opposed to a monolingual one. We have also specified 
some mental representations or data structures (the contents of lexical stores or knowledge stores, 
proposition-like mental representations, and situation models): once again, none of which are in-
trinsically translational. We have moved to the algorithmic/representational level of explanation. 
If we look at current research in cognitive translation studies, it is obvious that our research in-
terest does not extend much beyond this intermediate level of description. If we think of our lev-
els of organization from a Marrian perspective, then our understanding of translation processes is 
actually relatively shallow. We study broad abstract processes (comprehension, for instance) and 
try to delve down to understand the interaction of a set of less abstract (but still generalizing) in-
termediate processes and mental representations as they engage during translation (lexical selec-
tion, for instance). We generally stop there and only now are venturing to proceed much further.
It seems to me that we really do have to extend our research interest to the implementation lev-
el and use the findings of the cognitive neurosciences to understand how the physical structure 
and function of the brain relates to the way a very complex higher level activity like translation 
could be carried out (see Maria Tymoczko’s 2012 call for research in this area). Encouragingly, 
there has been an increasing body of work grappling with these ideas in recent years, see, for ex-
ample García (2013), García et al. (2016), Shreve/Diamond (2016), and Diamond/Shreve (2010).
3. Levels of analysis: translation expertise
As in cognitive translation studies in general, we also have not delved much beyond the highest 
levels of analysis in our research on translation expertise, at least partly because expertise stud-
ies itself has always taken a relatively high level analytic stance. Early expertise research (first 
generation) was quite simple and high level indeed, reducing expertise to facility with problem 
solving (and characterized as a set of heuristic search methods). So, in this view, an expert “was 
someone particularly skilled at heuristic search” (Holyoak 1991: 301). A second generation of 
expertise researchers soon moved on to show that expertise was, while still about heuristics and 
problem solving, also heavily dependent on the accumulation of detailed domain knowledge, and 
on memory organization and inferencing patterns related to and precipitated by that accumulated 
knowledge. They argued that experts learned to do things well with the specific knowledge they 
accumulate via practice, hence procedural learning became an important focus of this second gen-
eration research.
Second generation theories dominated expertise studies for years, and they are the theoretical 
approaches most recently imported into translation studies (see Shreve 2002 among early adop-
ters). These early approaches to expertise are primarily computationalist at heart. Risku (1998) 
was the exception, advocating very early for a more connectionist perspective. For most second 
generation theories, many basic notions (e.g., chunking, automaticity) are explained from a pro-
duction rule-system perspective, a classic computationalist paradigm. Second generation theories 
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proposed many of the nine general axioms of expertise we accept today (the axioms are adapted 
from Feltovich et al. 2006; they are listed below with some key concepts related to each):
1. Expertise is task-specific and therefore limited to the task domain (localized task domain; 
restrictions are based on experiential history; lack of transfer to other task domains).
2. Knowledge and content matter are important to expertise (the more you know, the more you 
are able to know, e.g., there is enhanced learning capability in the domain; increased knowl-
edge precipitates cognitive changes, this may include such changes as proceduralization, 
optimization of memory retrieval, and so on).
3. Expertise involves larger and more integrated cognitive units (‘chunking’; task-specific 
encoding; long term memory structures in the domain form and are linked to task-specific 
perceptual patterns).
4. Expertise involves functional, abstracted representations of presented information (abstract-
ed representation of patterns and problems; problems as exemplars of more abstract classes; 
elaborated mental models of current task situation; schematization).
5. Expertise involves automated basic strokes (practice can produce automatisation of low-
er-level operations and allow development of higher-level skills and allocation of effort to 
metacognition and executive control).
6. Expertise involves the selective access of relevant information (changes in focus of atten-
tion during the task; ability to perceive the relevance of salient cues; improved problem 
identification and recognition of salient patterns).
7. Expertise involves reflection (greater task awareness; changes in nature and scope of 
metacognition; increased planning activity; greater process control).
8. Expertise is adaptive (progressive adaptation; restructuring of cognitive resources; reorgani-
zation of schemas; alterations in chunking).
9. Simple experience is not sufficient for the development of expertise (deliberate practice; 
motivational factors).
4. Broad generalizations
There are exceptions to these mainstays of expertise theory, see Keith J. Holyoak (1991) for some 
caveats and provisos relative to these axioms. As Holyoak (1991: 303-310) argues, there are cases 
where the empirical data provide some useful counter-evidence. For instance, sometimes experts 
do not perform better than novices. Sometimes experts do not work more efficiently and effica-
ciously, but actually work harder (see Scardamalia and Bereiter 1983 on writing tasks as ill-de-
fined problems); they exhibit more planning and problem solving than novices or less-skilled in-
dividuals.
While we cannot comment on all of the exceptions to these axioms of expertise here, Holy-
oak’s point is that these maxims, while useful, present a kind of monolithic view of expertise, a set 
of one size fits all characteristics supposedly applicable to all task domains, including translation. 
However, as Holyoak reminds us, the nature of the task domain and the nature of its constraints 
are supremely important; ultimately the nature of the task domain exerts an undeniable influence 
on the nature of the expertise. Expertise is not just one thing that happens in every task domain; it 
is inherently shaped by the nature of the tasks from which it emerges over hours of practice. There 
are many ways for expertise to manifest.
For instance, some scholars have argued for a distinction between routine expertise and adap-
tive expertise (Hatano and Inagaki 1986). Routine experts “are able to solve familiar types of 
problems quickly and accurately,” but are less capable with “novel problems” that occur when 
the task varies (Holyoak 1991: 310). Adaptive experts are those that exhibit a deeper conceptual 
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understanding of the task domain, and are more likely to be able to show innovation in problem 
solving. Adaptive expertise develops in task domains exhibiting significant variability in the task 
constraints, translation being a very good example.
Classical second-generation approaches to expertise adopted into translation studies typical-
ly deal with translation expertise as if it were routine expertise. There is a temptation to assume 
all expert translators would develop similar production rules that trigger certain actions, that they 
would chunk their input or organize their memories similarly, or that they would all similarly de-
velop strong problem-resolution methods and become more advanced in recognizing domain spe-
cific patterns. There is a general presumption that expertise is not transferable from the task do-
main. These second-generation presumptions, given in the list of axioms above, were imported 
into translation studies by a number of translation scholars, including Shreve (2002). But now it 
is time, perhaps, to step back and reconsider.
‘One-size-fits-all’ may not be the case. If translation expertise is, in fact, highly adaptive as a 
result of its acquisition in variable and unpredictable environments, then it is something more than 
routine skill acquisition, it requires a deeper understanding of the nature and goals of translation 
to deal with variability in the task domain, variability of content, of text-type and mode of expres-
sion, of skopos and brief, and of working environment.
Empirical observations of extreme variability in the nature of expert performance strain the ca-
pacity of second-generation computationalist models of expertise to account for its highly adap-
tive character. Holyoak (1991) suggests that a third generation of expertise studies might help 
resolve the quandary expertise studies finds itself in: a much too mechanistic and simplistic con-
ception of expertise that struggles to account for empirical evidence that expertise can be highly 
variable in its expression, especially in extremely variable task environments.
5. Symbolic connectionism
Holyoak (1991) suggests something called symbolic connectionism as a solution that (1) enhanc-
es the explanatory power of the expertise paradigm to allow for more highly variable manifesta-
tions of expertise and, perhaps more importantly, (2) provides an entrée to lower, more implemen-
tational levels of a model of expertise.
Given the extended introduction given earlier in this paper about the importance of levels of 
explanation, and the claim that we had not grappled sufficiently with the extension of translation 
studies and translation expertise into the lower implementation levels, symbolic connectionism 
can provide one useful avenue for us to rectify that situation.
For instance, the notion of a chunk (i.e., the knowledge structure that an expert creates and can 
retrieve in memory during task performance) can be given an implementation level interpreta-
tion via symbolic connectionism. We bridge from a more abstract notion at the middle levels of 
process understanding to a less abstract, more implementational, one at a lower level. One could 
conceive of a chunk, for instance, as a “tightly connected excitatory subnet of mutually support-
ive units” (Holyoak 1991: 315), where a unit is a neuron or cluster of neurons or “a conceptual 
entity related in a complex way to actual neurons” (Rumelhart et al. 1986: 329). The choice of the 
word ʻunitʼ is deliberate here, these units can be neurons, neuronal arrays, or they can be struc-
tures like lexical items, concepts, or propositions that may be posited to have a complex internal 
neurological character.
Symbolic connectionism or similar approaches can bridge the divide between computationalist 
perspectives of expertise too rigid to account for the variability of empirical data and connection-
ist or other implementational perspectives at too a low level  to readily explain research objects 
that encompass a multi-level complex interaction of constituent parts and processes.
Probably the best example of symbolic connectionism is that of Kintsch’s (1988) construc-
tion-integration model, where the ‘units’ are symbolic, but the relationships between the units 
during text comprehension are cased in connectionist language: activation of memory concepts 
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by lexical items in the text; spreading activation to close associates of the verbatim concepts; in-
ferencing of additional propositions and the associated creation of excitatory and inhibitory links 
with associated weights. Kintsch is able to explain a complex phenomenon such as text compre-
hension, but connect it to an underlying (and perhaps empirically defensible) implementation 
framework. It would not be too much of a leap to construct just such a bridge in translation stud-
ies to talk about translation processing and the acquisition of translation expertise.
If we go back to the axioms listed earlier, focusing on axioms three and four, we can see that 
increasing expertise has always been assumed to involve the efficacious consolidation, integration 
and abstraction of stored knowledge about a task and its relevant constraints, the reorganization of 
cognitive resources. If these developmental processes have an implementational, neural expres-
sion, then we should see evidence of that in neural scans (Guida et al. 2016: 4). 
Research has, in fact, provided evidence that this is just what occurs. Studies using experts 
and novices in different fields performing domain-specific working memory-related tasks tend 
to show that the brain areas activated to perform those tasks differ between novices and experts; 
there are changes in brain structure and function. There is even some pioneering work in inter-
preting studies, see for instance the work of Hervais-Adelman et al. (2017) or that of Becker et 
al. (2016) among others.
Guida et al. (2016: 5) have called these brain changes “functional neural reorganization,” and 
this reorganization has the side effect of reducing overall brain activity (explaining, in part, the 
claims of efficiency in expertise). Functional neural reorganization refers specifically to neuro-
plastic changes in the human brain associated with, for instance, expertise acquisition. This reor-
ganization can modify the way task-related brain regions interact. As explained by Bernardi et al. 
(2013: online): 
 Functional and effective connectivity analyses revealed that … functional changes in brain response 
may be accompanied also by modifications in the way task-related regions interact, usually with a 
strengthening of the essential couplings and a pruning of the unnecessary ones. Altogether, these ob-
servations support the so called neural efficiency hypothesis, which postulates a more efficient cortical 
functioning based on both a reduced utilization of resources and an improvement in information pro-
cessing, thanks to a better communication between task-related brain areas, in expert/skilled as com-
pared to ordinary individuals.
Thus, another mainstay of classical expertise studies, the restructuring of cognitive resources like 
schemas, for instance, can be given a neural and physiological interpretation.
We also know from the classical model of expertise that, as a result of extended (deliberate) 
practice, experts are assumed to develop domain-specific knowledge structures, what the litera-
ture calls chunks and schemas. Neural investigation has shown that this re-organization actually 
has a visible expression in the use of the medio-temporal lobe as compared to novices. For in-
stance, “novices typically use episodic long-term memory areas (e.g., the medio-temporal lobe) 
for performing long-term memory tasks, experts are able to (re)use these areas also for perform-
ing working memory tasks” (Guida et al. 2016: 5). This occurs because the more working memo-
ry and long term memory interact, the more they influence one another, enabling functional neu-
ral-cerebral reorganization. In experts, in the task domain, working memory and long term mem-
ory establish what Anderson (2014: 296) called an additional “functional coalition” between parts 
of the brain as compared to novices. Here we can see a neural expression of deliberate practice, 
can we not? Deliberate practice has precipitated a change in the way the brain works, adapting it, 
so to speak, to the needs of the task (Bilalic 2016).
So, reiterating the main point, we have reached the point (because of developments in both mo-
dels and in methods) where useful mid-level explanations of expertise (chunking, restructuring, 
efficiency gains) can be given an implementational, and in this case, neurological expression.
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6. Failure to launch
Over the last fifteen years, studies of the neural implementation of expertise have proceeded very 
quickly. Guida et al. (2016: 4) call the progress “prolific.” Yet neither in translation studies as a 
whole, nor in translation expertise studies specifically, have we consistently delved down to look 
at lower implementation levels, whether with the finer-grained constructs of neural networks or 
with studies employing neural imaging (that would answer the question, at least, of what occurs 
physically in the brain during translation). We are only now beginning this research in earnest.
My point in this article is to make the claim that in translation studies of expertise we have, 
for the most part, adopted the second-generation findings and constructs of expertise research and 
been content with them, content to remain at the middle level of analysis. We talk about problem 
solving, pattern recognition, schematization, chunking, automaticity; we look at changes in mem-
ory organization, saliency of cues, and locus of attention. These are distinctly intermediate levels 
of analysis, and unsurprisingly, computationalist in heritage. 
We need to move forward, but how? One way forward is to introduce approaches that (at least 
for now) bridge the gap between higher-level paradigms of translation and translation expertise 
to more implementational (for instance, neural network-based) perspectives. We have seen this 
bridging in Holyoak’s work, and his championing of symbolic connectionism, but it is also seen 
in the work of the implementational connectivists who also try to accommodate the computation-
alist and connectionist paradigms (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2015):
 They hold that the brainʼs net implements a symbolic processor. True, the mind is a neural net; but 
it is also a symbolic processor at a higher and more abstract level of description. So the role for con-
nectionist research according to the implementationalist is to discover how the machinery needed for 
symbolic processing can be forged from neural network materials, so that classical processing can be 
reduced to the neural network account.
7. Accommodating symbol processing, and a caveat
Now, I want to make a caveat here. I am avoiding the extreme argument between classical com-
putationalist paradigms and radical connectionists, the latter who would eliminate symbolic pro-
cessing (and any higher levels of analysis?) from cognitive science. I am arguing that, given the 
state of our models of translation and translation expertise, bridging models such as symbolic con-
nectionism and implementational connectivism serve an important explanatory function. They 
serve as important ways for us, with our necessarily high level interest as teachers and practition-
ers in the translation activity, to correlate and integrate what we can observe (and have observed, 
for decades) with what we are recently discovering about the structure and function of the brain. 
We are, perhaps, if not bound, then at least extremely well-suited to use these bridging ap-
proaches, or other so-called “hybrid approaches” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2015), 
given our commitment to indispensable symbolic notions like word, text, sentence, and meaning, 
all of which are higher-level aggregates of what is undoubtedly a much messier and more com-
plex neuro-cognitive reality.
In translation studies we tend (and have historically tended) to approach language and trans-
lation explicitly as a symbol processing problem, and maybe we must do so, given the complex 
character of the research problem we are attempting to resolve, and its quintessentially symbolic 
nature. Certainly we have a long disciplinary history of talking about translation as symbol pro-
cessing that we cannot easily discard. It is by this time part of the core conceptual apparatus of our 
discipline, and perhaps indispensable as a form of explanation and analysis. This article argues for 
a continuation of the trend in our discipline to adopt a sort of Langackerian understanding of con-
structs like ‘word’ and see them also as symbolic points of access (‘access nodes’) to underlying 
knowledge networks, and, ultimately, neuronal structures (Langacker 1987: 161-164).
So we may be more inclined to find success in drilling down to the lower levels of the transla-
tion activity if we can find an approach to help us account for translation-oriented language sym-
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bol processing at the level of brain architecture. Implementationalists are our natural allies be-
cause they explicitly recognize that symbolic systems and connectionism are distinct levels of de-
scription, but argue that the two levels of description need one another. 
For instance, pattern recognition is very well explained in connectionist models; changes in 
pattern recognition ability are often seen as fundamental to the acquisition of expertise. From neu-
ral network models of pattern recognition we have identified and explained important properties 
such as graceful degradation, noise tolerance, and the ability to generalize. These are also poten-
tially important aspects of expertise to consider. Such properties have been remarked in the com-
putationalist symbol processing literature, but the older paradigm lacked any robust explanation 
as to how these phenomena might arise from a neural substrate. So to a great extent, connection-
ism and neural network models, or other lower level models, can provide additional explanatory 
power to our existing models. More importantly, connectionist or other possible implementation 
level explanations might also more closely mirror natural or physical reality, since one could, os-
tensibly, more easily find neuro-physiological evidence for them. We need to be mindful of pro-
moting cognitive theories or models that have no possible point of attachment to the realities of 
brain structure and function.
One way of achieving this goal of having models and theories with both explanatory and pre-
dictive power and some connection to the actual operation of the brain is to seek connections be-
tween our higher-level symbolic models and those detailing the minutiae of neural interaction. 
However, a problem for translation scientists looking for implementation level explanations is 
this: given the inextricable relationship of translation processes to language processes, how do we 
not get lost? The answer (which also coincides with our understanding of expertise) is to focus on 
the task and its unique character and constraints.
The translation unit, we argue, is the smallest unit of behavior that can be studied where the 
underlying goal-orientation of the task exerts an influence. It is the minimal task decomposition 
possible before we are studying something else other than translation, as for instance L2 reading or 
native language (L1) production. If we are going to look at how translation arises from underlying 
neural mechanisms, then we have to study how those mechanisms are engaged during bona fide 
translation tasks and focus on translation units as the primary object of research interest. 
One of the values of neural network models, as we have alluded, is that they help us understand 
some things better than classical models do. For instance, schemas (forms of memory organiza-
tion/representation) have been an important part of expertise studies. Neural networks provide a 
useful explanation for how schemas arise. Rumelhart et al. (1986), for instance, argued that they 
were emergent states of neural networks. A schema is not a single neuron, but neurons working 
together can realize a schema (McClelland 2010).
When we adopt a multi-level system of explanation that breaks down complex systems into 
smaller units, then one can use emergence as a way to explain properties of mid-level constructs 
that are otherwise mysterious. Connectionists have argued that words and grammar rules are no 
more than emergent properties of clusters of simple processing units (neurons) whose connection 
weights are affected by experience due to hearing spoken language (McClelland 2010). Arguably, 
then, concepts are clusters of sub-networks; and propositions emerge from networks of sub-net-
work clusters. Finally, a network of networks represents our understanding of a text, all emergent 
as the component units, nodes and neurons, activate and interact serially and in parallel during 
the online task.
We have already seen how chunking and restructuring can be interpreted as effects of neuronal 
systems being trained over long periods of time in a discrete task. Automaticity, a mainstay of ex-
pertise models, can also be understood as emerging from task repetition (see Cohen et al. 1990 
where performance differences in a Stroop task were accounted for by differences in experiential 
inputs into a connectionist network). 
Even expert metacognition could be given a neural network interpretation, as a state arising 
from the accumulation of task experience in a metacognitive memory network supporting, for in-
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stance, improved task awareness, judgments of success and failure, and uncertainty management. 
Certainly there has been progress in understanding the physiological and neural bases of metacog-
nition, as in the work of Fleming/Dolan (2012) who concluded that there are potentially separable 
brain systems for prospective and retrospective judgments of performance. Thus, almost all of the 
important aspects of translation expertise from chunking through to metacognition could be at-
tached to physiological structures and locations, and be at a deeper level of explanation.
The contribution of this paper, rather, is in the argument that our object of study, highly com-
plex and explicitly symbolic by its very nature, profits greatly from the adoption of an explicitly 
leveled approach to explanation and bridging approaches that successfully connect task-bound 
mid-level constructs like translation processes to constructs like neural networks and from there, 
potentially, to physical brain-level structures.
Expertise in translation, and in general, arises as a result of the interactions of the many, many 
neurons that are brought online to accomplish a particular task, a task repeated over and over 
again, via deliberate practice, until performance is consistently superior. Translation expertise is 
the consequence of training a set of neural networks with the right kind of data over the requisite 
amount of time. But, even if that statement is true, and I believe that it is, explaining the acquisi-
tion of expertise and its expression at the level of the task fruitfully and comprehensively across 
disciplines might require a multi-level descriptive apparatus, like that proposed initially by Marr 
(1982).
8. Conclusion
Marr’s highest level of explanation emphasizes the goal-oriented computational task. But we can 
also imagine the utility of levels of explanation above the computational also being accommodat-
ed by his approach. As Muñoz (2010) and Risku (2014) have successfully argued, cognitive pro-
cessing in translation (and by extension translation expertise) cannot be understood completely 
unless we account for the embedded nature of cognition; it occurs within a physical, social and 
cultural environment; cognition has a property of situatedness that we cannot ignore. The transla-
tion activity we observe ethnographically (in its natural setting) is invoked and provoked by so-
cio-cultural factors and processes, and they, acting through the translator as social actor, provoke 
a specific contextually bound kind of cognition.
The internal processes of a discrete act of translating and the active external social and com-
municative processes of the context of the act intersect at the task. Thus, the task remains an im-
portant focus of translation and expertise research. The serial bursts of text comprehension (read-
ing) and text production (writing) we observe when someone translates, translation units, are the 
behavioral manifestation of an underlying cognitive dynamic prompted by a task, a situated so-
cio-cognitive demand placed on an actor. 
Even as we extend our understanding of expertise down to the neural level, we must also rec-
ognize that it is necessary to extend upwards. It is all processes within processes, and thus, poten-
tially, levels of explanation within levels of explanation. When we seek explanations of how any 
task can be carried out, we can go quite possibly very much further down in levels of explanation; 
the neuron networks of the brain are not the lowest level of consideration. We could proceed to the 
cellular, the molecular, the atomic, and, perhaps, the quantum. As we move up in levels of expla-
nation from the situated task, we could also go quite a lot further up, from the social and cultural 
perhaps all the way to the cosmological. But, as a matter of necessity, we circumscribe our levels 
of explanation, restricting our interests to those task-adjacent levels that contribute materially to 
the robustness of the explanation we wish to furnish.
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